

to understand and do justice to some of Homer's intentional perturbations of surface structure. In other instances, where for example a conjunction superfluous to the presumed logical syntax threatens to mislead the reader into punctuating incorrectly, thereby mistaking the true meaning, Nicanor points out the true logical connection and punctuates accordingly, the most important function of language being to express meanings as clearly as possible.

### Linguistic Theories in the Rhetorical Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus \*)

By DIRK M. SCHENKEVELD, Heemstede (Holland)

0. The last decades have seen the publication of several important studies on the history of ancient linguistics. The period before Apollonius Dyscolus has especially been in the limelight, and gradually it has become clear that the authenticity of the *Techne* ascribed to Dionysius Thrax and the level of linguistic studies at the time of Aristarchus and his pupils form a pivotal problem.<sup>1)</sup>

All these studies have one omission in common, in that they have all neglected the *opuscula rhetorica* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (DH) as a possible source of information for the level of linguistic knowledge in the second half of the first century B.C. As I hope to prove, these works cast some light on this matter. It is, however, outside the scope of this article to relate here these results to the problem indicated above.

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\*) Dionysius Hal. (DH) is quoted after the Teubner edition of H. Usener-L. Radermacher (1899-1904), by chapter, page and line. Ep. Amm. = the second Letter to Ammaeus. Rhys Roberts 1901 and 1910 refer to the well-known translation and commentaries of *The Three Literary Letters and On Literary Composition* resp.; Aujac = *Dénys d'Halicarnasse, Opuscules rhétoriques III*, par Germaine Aujac et Maurice Lebel, CUF 1981. Vol. I (1978) is cited as Aujac I; Pritchett = *Dionysius of Hal., On Thucydides*, transl. by W. K. Pritchett, Univ. Cal. Pr. 1975; Usher = *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The Critical Essays in two Volumes*, with an English translation by Stephen Usher, Loeb Cl. Libr., 1974. Dr. Pauline Allen kindly corrected my English.

<sup>1)</sup> See W. Ax, *Aristarch und die "Grammatik"*, *Glotta* 60, 1980, 96-119 and literature cited there.

The main reason for neglecting these rhetorical works will have been the almost unassailable position of the *Techne* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially since the publication of Schmidt's article (1850<sup>2</sup>). Moreover, the opinion that the *Techne*'s grammatical system and its underlying theory soon had become common knowledge,<sup>3</sup> may have led to the assumption that DH's rhetorical works could offer no new material, only some well known facts. But even after Di Benedetto (1958) had started to undermine the position of the *Techne*, no real attention was paid to DH's works. It is true that scholars have discussed the second chapter of *Comp. Verb.* because it contains a history of the development of a word class system, and Barwick as well as Pinborg has adduced several other passages, especially in connection with problems of Stoic grammar.<sup>4</sup> On the whole, however, one will look in vain for a study such as is undertaken now.<sup>5</sup>

Although, of course, some results will be more important than others, I intend to present a complete survey of relevant material as well as to discuss similarities to and deviations from what is nowadays called 'traditional grammar', i.e. the grammatical system and theories as apparent from the *Techne*, its commentaries and the works of Apollonius Dyscolus. Comparisons with what is known about Stoic grammar will also be made.<sup>6</sup>

Apart from some short references, neither the chapter on the history of the word class system (*Comp. Verb.* 2) nor those on letters and vowels (*ibid.* 14 and 15) is discussed here. Both subjects do in fact belong to a proper survey of ancient linguistic theory, but are easily separated from the rest of Dionysius' theories. Moreover, his theory on letters and syllables is probably influenced by studies

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<sup>2</sup>) *Philol.* 8, 1853, 231ff. Cp. V. Di Benedetto *ANS* 27, 1958, 69ff.

<sup>3</sup>) E.g. Rhys Roberts, 1910, 46f. and H. Erbse, *Glotta* 58, 1980, 246<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>4</sup>) K. Barwick, *Remmius Palaemon und die römische Ars grammatica*, Leipzig 1922, 95 and 102, and *Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik*, Berlin 1957, 47f. J. Pinborg, *Classical antiquity: Greece in: Current trends in Linguistics*, vol. 13,1, The Hague 1975, 102 and 111.

<sup>5</sup>) Commentators and editors of these treatises (e.g. Rhys Roberts, Aujac and Pritchett) have often made sound annotations on linguistic aspects, but these have passed unnoticed.

<sup>6</sup>) Of course, this qualification does not imply a chronological priority, e.g. 'traditional' since 2nd cent. B.C., nor does tracing back various data to Stoic or other sources mean that I believe that in the 1st cent. B.C., or earlier, contending schools were existing.

of Aristoxenus and of *οἱ κριτικοί*<sup>7)</sup> rather than by linguistic views. Furthermore the history-chapter can be more profitably discussed in the context of a treatment of other histories, something I hope to tackle at a later date.

It is self-evident that the character of his works precludes DH from discussing grammatical theory fully. What he offers in this field stands always in the service of his argument on literary matters. Thus, the historical chapter serves as an introduction to the view that combinations of words make cola, which in combination produce periods. In *Comp. Verb.* 5 DH discusses the possibility of a natural order of the *partes orationis*, e.g. *nomina* before *verba*, in order to show that such an approach is fruitless for a theory about *σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων*. When he exemplifies his views on the three *ἁρμονίαι συνθέσεως*, he analyzes several *κῶλα* of famous authors and distinguishes some words according to their word class, but soon he abandons this method and focuses on the sounds of these words. The most extensive use of linguistic notions he makes in *Ep. Amm.* 2.422ff. when he expands what he has said in *De Thucyd.* 24 on the *σχηματισμοί* of Thucydides.

Accordingly, Dionysius' grammatical remarks are mostly incidental, and therefore shed interesting light on the level of grammatical knowledge of a man who, relatively speaking, is a layman in this field. I must add that evidently DH did not have this knowledge when he arrived at Rome about 30 B.C., but only several years later. For in his earliest treatises, collected in *De ant. orator.*, no trace of grammatical distinctions can be found, and it is not before *De Demosthene* that terms such as *μέρια λόγου*, *σύνδεσμος*, *πτῶσις*, *ἀκολουθία*, *κατάλληλον* occur. Prior to this treatise only *ὄνομα* is found, then with the meaning of 'word' tout court. Nowadays it is generally held that *De Demosthene*, *De Comp. Verb.*, *De Thucydide*, *Ep. ad Ammaeum* and *De Dinarcho* are the latest works of DH<sup>8)</sup>. Whereas the diverging character of the last treatise explains why technical terms do not occur in *De Dinarcho*, we find these in the other four. Because, as we shall see, DH does not use grammatical terms in e.g. *De Lysia* when he could have done so, it is evident that he acquired his information when he had already been in Rome for some time.

<sup>7)</sup> See W. Kroll, *Rhein. Mus.* 62, 1907, 91ff. on influence of Aristoxenus, and Karin Pohl, *Die Lehre von den drei Wortfügungsarten*, thesis Tübingen 1968, 97ff. and 146ff. and my article, *Mnem.* 21, 1968, 176ff. on *οἱ κριτικοί*.

<sup>8)</sup> Usher xxvi; Aujac I 22f.

1. In the history chapter, *Comp. Verb.* 2.6, 17ff. DH mentions nine *partes orationis*, *ὄνομα*, *ῥῆμα*, *σύνδεσμος*, *ἄρθρον*, *προσηγορικόν*, *ἀντονομασία*, *ἐπίρρημα*, *πρόθεσις* and *μετοχή*, and adds that more distinctions had been made. From this list it appears that he knows of a system of nine classes. Though he uses the term *προσηγορικόν* this form does not suggest the bipartition, known from traditional grammar, of *ὄνομα* into two subclasses, *κύριον* and *προσηγορικόν*,<sup>9)</sup> for at 7,15 DH clearly indicates that by *προσηγορικόν* a separate class is meant.

His terminology for *partes orationis*, here and elsewhere, is fluctuating, for *τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη* or *μόρια* as well as *τὰ μέρη/μόρια τῆς λέξεως* appear, and even *τά τῆς φράσεως μόρια*, *στοιχεῖα λέξεως* and *στοιχειώδη μόρια*.<sup>10)</sup> In traditional grammar *τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια/μέρη* is the usual term<sup>11)</sup>.

When indicating separate classes he uses either substantives (*ὄνομα*, *προσηγορία*) or adjectives, if necessary substantively, such as *τὰ προθετικά μόρια*, *τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα*, *τὸ προσηγορικόν*.<sup>12)</sup> In this respect his terminology agrees with that of traditional grammar.

*ὄνομα* may indicate *nomen proprium* as distinct from *nomen appellativum* (*προσηγορία*), but more often it just means 'word.' In this case, it is equivalent to *λέξεις* and is used to differentiate between words and sentences (*λόγος*). In the same way *μόρια λόγου* may be used, without any connotation of 'word class'. This use of *ὄνομα* is common, and Ap. Dysc. is right in saying: *κατεκράτησεν οὖν καὶ ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ θέσις τὸ πάντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καλεῖσθαι ὀνόματα* (*synt.* 19, 2f.).

Outside the history chapter also, DH uses the system of nine word classes, as is shown by the following list (p. 71). Apart from *ὄνομα(-τικόν)* and *ῥῆμα(-τικόν)*, all occurrences for the remaining classes are listed. The listing is made on the basis of the four treatises mentioned before.

From this survey it appears that, apart from ch. 2, in *Comp. Verb.* all classes occur except *μετοχή*, for the missing *ἄρθρον* is represented by *ἄναρθρος*. Presumably DH did not need to use *μετοχή*

<sup>9)</sup> Cp. Uhlig on *Techne* 23,2 and 33,6ff.

<sup>10)</sup> *Comp. Verb.* 1.1.; 4.21,18; 6.29,13; 30,14; *De Thuc.* 24.361,18; 22.358,13; *De Dem.* 30.211,24. Cp. Rhys Roberts 1901, 197.

<sup>11)</sup> DH does not distinguish between *στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου* and *στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως*, as is done in *Diog. Laert.* 7,56ff. See also Rhys Roberts, indices, s. vv.

<sup>12)</sup> *Ep. Amm.* 12,432,10; *Comp. Verb.* 22.101–103.

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and *ἄρθρον*. More striking is the absence of *ἐπίρρημα* from De Thuc. and Ep. Amm., whereas *ἀντονομασία* is not found in De Thuc. 24, and, accordingly, not in Ep. Amm. 2 either, but it does occur elsewhere in both treatises. The absence of *ἐπίρρημα* can be explained by the purpose of the list in De Thuc. 24: DH wants to show that in his use of *σχήματα*<sup>13)</sup> Thucydides continuously deviates from (*ἐναλλάττεται*) ordinary syntax. Probably examples of deviation were lacking for adverbs.<sup>14)</sup>

Word classes	Treatises De Demosthene ch. 2	De Comp. Verborum other chh.	De Thucydide	Ep. ad Ammaeum II
1. <i>ὄνομα</i> - <i>τικόν/ή</i>	passim x —	passim 26,13; 44,16f.	passim 361,23ff.; 358,13; 389,18 361,21ff.	passim 423,6ff.; 425,19ff.
- <i>τικῶς</i>				423,4ff.; 426,15ff.
2. <i>προσηγορία</i> - <i>ικόν</i>	— x	— 26,12f.; 101,8ff.; 102,17; 103,9; 105,6; 108,18	— 361,23f.	430,13ff. 423,6f.
3. <i>ῥῆμα</i> - <i>τικόν/ή</i>	passim x —	passim 103,9	passim 358,13; 361,21	passim 423,4; 426,1ff.
4. <i>μετοχή</i> - <i>ικόν</i>	— x	—	— 362,7	430,13; 431,1 *) 423,14; 432,10
5. <i>ἄρθρον</i>	213,7 x	— ( <i>ἀναρθρος</i> 98,2)	389,16 (362,10)	430,14 (424,1)
6. <i>ἀντονομασία</i> ( <i>ἀντωνυμία</i> ) - <i>αστικόν</i>	— x	26,13; 29,20	389,17	432,11
7. <i>πρόθεσις</i>  - <i>ικόν</i>	— x	30,2; 102,17	362,10	423,17
8. <i>ἐπίρρημα</i>	185,19 x	24,19; 25,4 and 11	—	—

<sup>13)</sup> For the wide meaning of *σχήματα/σχηματισμοί* here see J. Ros, *Die METABOLH*, Nijmegen 1938, 39<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>14)</sup> See Ros 172 for such an example.

\*) *τῆς μετοχῆς*, deleted by Usener, should be put instead of *μόριον*.

9. σύνδεσμος	146,19; x	101,9ff.;	
	213,7;	102,16;	
	232,22;	129,5;	
	242,21	(ὀλιγοσύν- δετος 98,2)	
-δευτικόν		358,14;	423,16
		263,10	

Notwithstanding these exceptions we may safely ascribe to DH the use of the system of nine word classes.<sup>15)</sup> This system differs from the traditional eight-parts system by the separate class of *προσηγορία*. In accordance with this system DH nowhere employs *κύριον* to indicate nomen proprium, but only with the meaning of 'word in its proper sense' as opposed to 'trope' (*τρόπος, τροπική λέξις*).<sup>16)</sup> However, in Ep. Amm. 5.426,20ff. both *παραίνεσις* and *ἀξίωσις* are called *ὀνοματικά*, and not *προσηγορικά*, as DH should have called it in the framework of nine parts. Consequently, the question arises whether his usage of a nine-parts system is superficial only. This I am inclined to doubt, for he does employ the distinction of *προσηγορία* and *ὀνόματα* in the same treatise, Ep. Amm. 11.430, 12ff. and calls *πόλεις* a *προσηγορία*<sup>17)</sup>. Moreover, we can explain why earlier on the bipartition is neglected. In De Thuc. 24 and in its correlate chapter, Ep. Amm. 2, DH first mentions Thucydides' variations between *λόγος* and *ὄνομα*, viz. the use of a phrase instead of one word, and vice versa. From Ep. Amm. 4.425,19ff. it follows that in this context by *ὄνομα* are meant *ὄνομα* as well as *ῥῆμα*. The next example concerns the change from 'noun' to 'verb' and vice versa. There, too, DH does not yet need to distinguish between *ὄνομα* in a restricted sense and *προσηγορία*, and so he can call *ἀξίωσις* an *ὀνοματικόν*. It is only in ch. 11 that the bipartition becomes appropriate and there it is in fact indicated. It may be added that nowhere does DH classify a proper name. A similar explanation may be adduced in the case of *ῥῆμα*, which is used to indicate a participle (ibid. 427,17), although *μετοχή* occurs elsewhere.<sup>18)</sup>

<sup>15)</sup> Aujac seems to suggest that DH used a system of eight parts. In his discussion on the supposedly natural order of the parts of speech DH (Comp. Verb. 5.26,11f.) mentions the rule of putting *τὰ ὀνοματικά* before *τὰ ἐπίθετα*. Nevertheless, I do not agree with Rhys Roberts, 1901, 192 and 1910, 299, who thinks that DH regards *ἐπίθετον* as a separate part of speech.

<sup>16)</sup> See Rhys Roberts, indices s.v.

<sup>17)</sup> Cp. Comp. Verb. 5.26,13 and 22.101,9ff.

<sup>18)</sup> The same explanation is valid for Comp. Verb. 5.23,19ff.

For these reasons I conclude that in principle DH's classification is based upon the nine-parts system. This conclusion agrees with what we know nowadays of the usage of the nine-parts system in the first century B.C.<sup>19)</sup> The provenance of this system is unknown, but it is at least partially based upon a Stoic distinction between *ὄνομα* and *προσηγορία*, although Stoic grammar distinguishes only five parts, as Diog. Laertius 7,57 shows. It would be dangerous, therefore, to call the nine-parts system typically Stoic.

Before entering into a discussion of passages which exhibit traces of a different system I would point out that DH uses *ἀντονομασία* (-στικόν), whereas the traditional term *ἀντωνυμία* occurs once only in the Teubner edition (Comp. Verb. 6, p. 29,20). When *ἀντονομασία* is used, MSS. vary, for *ἀντωνυμία*(-ικόν) is also found. But in view of the popularity of the latter word in traditional grammar original *ἀντονομασία* will have been changed by copyists into the other word, and Usener is right in proposing *ἀντονομασία* as opposed to the unanimous tradition (Comp. Verb. 1.1.).<sup>20)</sup> Apoll. Dysc. tells us (pron. 4,18ff.) that Comanus (s. I B.C.) used *ἀντονομασία*, and in Pap. Yale 1,25, l. 4 too (s. I A.D.) this word is found again<sup>21)</sup>. *Ἀντονομασία* lost the battle against *ἀντωνυμία*, probably because the first word could also be used to indicate a poetical trope.<sup>22)</sup>

2. In the foregoing section we have met with several examples of the application of a system of word classes, examples, therefore, of what Ap. Dysc. calls *μερισμός*. This procedure was sometimes rather difficult, and from his works we learn about ingenious discussions on the status of *δεῖ*, *χρή* etc. Therefore in itself it does not surprise us that twice DH, too, wavers between classifications. But on both these occasions cases are concerned which in traditional grammar were no problem at all. Then to all appearances DH uses a system of less than nine (or eight) parts and mixes it with the full-blown one.

The first time he does so, is Comp. Verb. 22.102,16f. In this chapter he analyzes a Pindaric dithyramb (fr. 75 Sn.-M.) as an

<sup>19)</sup> See A. Wouters, *The grammatical papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt*, Brussel 1979, 177ff. According to Sarah Molyneaux Weems, *Greek gramm. papyri: the school texts*, thesis Missouri 1981, a standard *Techne* was not accepted before 4th cent. A.D. In passing, I may be permitted to remark that in his history chapter DH does not mention a system of eight parts.

<sup>20)</sup> Aujac retains *ἀντωνυμία*. *Ἀντονομασία* with -ω- (so F<sup>2</sup> 26,13) occurs elsewhere, e.g. Schol. Iliad M 1d.

<sup>21)</sup> See Wouters 59.

<sup>22)</sup> Schol. DThr. 462,4ff. et al.

example of *ἀρμονία ἀσπηρά*. He discusses the first cola and classifies the words there by their grammatical names as follows:

- col. 1–2 *Δεῦτ' ἐν χρόνον Ὀλύμπιοι*  
*ἐπί τε κλυτὰ πέμπετε (χάριν θεοί)*  
col. 1 *ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, δύο προσηγορικά,*  
col. 2 *σύνδεσμος/πρόθεσις, σύνδεσμος, προσηγορικόν, ῥῆμα.*<sup>23)</sup>

To classify *χρόνον*, *Ὀλύμπιοι*, *κλυτάν* as *προσηγορικά*, *τε* as *σύνδεσμος* and *πέμπετε* as *ῥῆμα* is as one may expect, but to say that *ἐν* and *ἐπί* are *σύνδεσμοι* is surprising, although DH admits that *ἐπί* may also be called a *πρόθεσις* (192,16: *τοῖς ἐπί τε συνδέσμοις ἀφ' ὧν ἄρχεται τὸ κῶλον, εἴτε ἄρα πρόθεσιν αὐτῶν δεῖ τὸ ἡγούμενον καλεῖν*). This classification of *ἐπί* and *τε* as *σύνδεσμοι* is a sure sign of a system with less than nine (or eight) parts.<sup>24)</sup> It is precisely because DH also offers an alternative division that we are able to trace this system. For we know that the Stoics called prepositions *σύνδεσμοι προθετικοί*, in other words, to them the range of *σύνδεσμοι* was larger than in the later systems of nine or eight parts,<sup>25)</sup> and in this older system *ἐν* had to be called a *σύνδεσμος*.

In order to conclude this analysis of the Pindaric dithyramb, I would point out that the merismos of *δεῦτε* as *ῥῆμα* is paralleled by Et. Gud. 139,44,<sup>26)</sup> and this parallel favours the retention of *δεῦτε* against the MSS. alternative reading of *ἴδετε*.<sup>27)</sup>

On the other occasion when DH hesitates between two choices, the same conclusion is imperative. Moreover, this case offers an interesting parallel to a hotly debated datum concerning Dionysius Thrax. In De Thucyd. 37 DH quotes from the Melian dialogue (Hist. 5,86) the passage: *ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ φαίνετε*. According to him *αὐτοῦ* refers to *ἡ ἐπιείκεια*, and a more grammatical agreement would have been achieved if at the end of this phrase Thucydides had written *διαφέροντα αὐτῆς φαίνετε*.<sup>28)</sup> Now, DH classifies the obnoxious word *αὐτοῦ*

<sup>23)</sup> The remaining words of the dithyramb are no longer classified, except that *πανδαίδαλον* (col. 5) is ranked under the *προσηγορικά* (105,6).

<sup>24)</sup> So, too, Aujac 154<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>25)</sup> Ap. Dysc. synt. 436,13ff. and Uhlig a.1.

<sup>26)</sup> Cp. Et. Magn. 259,2.10 and Anecd. Oxon. Cramer 1,109,16ff.

<sup>27)</sup> Aujac prefers *ἴδετε* of P, but there is no reason to do so, the more so as she remarks that “certaines formes dialectales semblent mieux conservées ou restituées dans F” (45, cp. 52ff.).

<sup>28)</sup> On this reading *φαίνετε pro φαίνεται* of the MSS see Pritchett 123<sup>15</sup>.



as follows: *εἴτε ἄρθρον δεικτικὸν βούλεται τις αὐτὸ καλεῖν εἴτε ἀντωνομασίαν* (389, 16f.).

In his commentary on this passage G. Pavano (Palermo 1958) merely says that by these two terms DH means the same, and Pritchett (123, n. 14) remarks that according to Apollonius Dyscolus (pron. 5, 18f.) "Apollodorus of Athens and Dionysius Thrax called pronouns *ἄρθρα δεικτικά*," but in the specialized literature on ancient linguistics no reference can be found to this passage from De Thuc., whereas it sheds new light on the communication of Apoll. Dysc. Therefore, I shall discuss this passage to a greater extent than seems desirable at first sight.

Apoll. Dysc. gives *αὐτός* as an *ἀντωνυμία* with anaphoric value. Within the pronouns he distinguishes between *δεικτικά* and *ἀναφορικά*, *οὗτος*, *ἐκεῖνος* etc. being deictic and *αὐτός* anaphoric. *Οὗτος* etc. occasionally have anaphoric value but *αὐτός* is never used in a deictic sense.<sup>29)</sup> The Stoics, however, he tells us (pron. 5, 14 ff.), had not distinguished pronouns as a separate class, but put them under the *ἄρθρα*. This class consisted of two groups, *ἄρθρα ἀόριστα* (or *ἀοριστώδη*) which were the articles, and *ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα*, the pronouns. According to a later source, Schol. DTh. 518, 32 ff., within the latter group a further subdivision between *διὰ δειξέως* and *δι' ἀναφορᾶς* had been made. But the way the Scholiast formulates this information betrays the fact that he has mixed Stoic and Apollonian terminology and, therefore, makes it unreliable. So far it is not clear which pronouns were recognized by Stoics as definite articles. This problem is aggravated when Diog. Laert. 7, 78 is explained in this way, that to them *οὗτος* was a definite article, but *ἐκεῖνος* an indefinite one. A way out seems to be present in the information which Apollonius adds immediately after his exposition of the Stoic view: *Καὶ Ἀπολλόδορος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος καὶ ὁ Θραξ Διονύσιος καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικά τὰς ἀντωνυμίας ἐκάλουν*. In interpreting this passage scholars nowadays go two different ways, for according to Di Benedetto (1958, 209–210) Dionysius Thrax and Apollodorus put all pronouns under *ἄρθρα δεικτικά*, according to others this was the case for demonstrativa only, perhaps together with the personalia.<sup>30)</sup> Besides, the interpretation of the first and

<sup>29)</sup> Pron. 10, 2f.; synt. 87, 1ff. and 267, 6ff. and see Uhlig a. l.

<sup>30)</sup> Erbse, 254–7. Cp. M. Pohlenz, *Begründung* 55, and see R. Schneider comm. ad loc. for older interpretations. According to Erbse we have to take *δεικτικά* with *τὰς ἀντωνυμίας* as well. His parallel to this *ἀπό κοινοῦ* usage does not apply, however, for con. 248, 10 stands in a quotation from Chaeremon

third *καί* was not unanimous, and in the view of Erbse Dionysius Thrax used both the terms *ἀντωνυμία* and *ἄρθρον δεικτικόν*, whereas Di Benedetto thought that this ancient grammarian did not use *ἀντωνυμία*, but beside the Stoic *ἄρθρον ὠρισμένον* used *ἄρθρον δεικτικόν* also.<sup>31)</sup>

It seems to me that in the discussion of the Apollonian passage the meaning of *δεικτικός* has been taken for granted, and this word has been identified with 'demonstrative', in which case an anaphoric value was either denied or neglected. It was not said explicitly but the presumption often was that to Stoics *δειξις* had the same meaning as to Apollonius.<sup>32)</sup> However, in 1974 Frede made the view probable that to Stoics "nicht nur Aussagen mit demonstrativ verwendeten Pronomina als Subjektsausdruck, sondern auch solche mit anaphorisch verwendeten Pronomina definit sind."<sup>33)</sup>

When we take together the various data on the Stoic theory of deixis and pronouns and the information on Dionysius Thrax, the most acceptable exegesis seems to me that Stoics called both demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns *ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα* a), and that Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax followed Stoic views when they called these words *ἄρθρα δεικτικά* also b), i.e. apart from the Stoic nomenclature.

A relict of this tradition we have now when DH calls *αὐτοῦ* an *ἄρθρον δεικτικόν*. But after Dionysius Thrax and Apollodorus pronouns acquired names of their own, *ἀντονομασία* or *ἀντωνυμία*. It seems probable that at the same time this implied a distinction of pronouns as a separate class, but this we do not know for sure. At any rate, the passage from De Thuc. 37 clearly shows that DH knows of two kinds of classification. One of these fits into a system with fewer parts whereas the other one is at home in a system with nine (or eight) parts of speech.

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(a), and *αὐτοὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι* refers to all connectives, which even when they are used superfluously do not connect at all, but nevertheless are called *syndesmoi* (b). Of course, Erbse is right in denying that all possible pronouns are meant, but this restriction to personal, demonstrative and anaphoric, which applies already to the statement on the Stoics, is ignored by Ap. Dysc.

<sup>31)</sup> The relationship of this passage to the question of the authenticity of the *Technē* needs no discussion here.

<sup>32)</sup> Erbse 255f.

<sup>33)</sup> M. Frede, *Die Stoische Logik*, Göttingen 1974, 54f. Cp. H. Hagius, *The Stoic Theory of the Parts of Speech*, thesis Columb. Univ. 1979, 33 and 165f. For these reasons Wouters 54 is wrong in thinking that Pap. Yale 1.25 ll. 20–1 *ἀναφορά* is omitted.

The remaining cases of merismos do not call for comment, because they neither point to a system other than the one we already know was used by DH nor are different from the classification in works of traditional grammar. Therefore, it suffices simply to list these cases:

1. ὄνομα	C. V. 5.23ff. Ep. Amm. 19.426ff. 429	ἀνὴρ, μῆνις, ἡέλιος, τέκος, Μοῦσαι, Ἀχιλλεύς παραίνεσις, ἀξιώσις, ἀποτείχισις, δλόφουρσις, ἀνάγκη, πόλεμος Συρακόσιος, Ἀθηναῖος, τάραχος, ταραχή, δχλησις, δχλος
2. προσηγορία	C. V. 22.101ff. 105,6 108,18 Ep. Amm. 11.430,20ff.	χορός, Ὀλύμπιοι, χάρις, κλυτός πανδαίδαλος Ἀθηναῖος πόλις
3. ῥήμα	C. V. 5.23ff. Ep. Amm. 5.426.20 12.431.22f.	ἐννεπε, αἶειδε, ἀνόρουσε, κλυθι, μνη- σαι, τύπτε, ἤριπε, ἐκλίνθη, ἔκπεσε, πέτονται, ἐκφανεῖ, ἔρυσαν etc., δεῦτε παρανεῖν, ἀξιοῦν, ἀποτειχίσαι, δλοφύρασθαι ἐθέλομεν, περιγίγνεται, γίνεται, περίεσαι, ἔσται
4. μετοχή	Ep. Amm. 12.432,10	μενόντων
5. ἄρθρον	—	—
6. ἀντονομασία	C. V. 6.29,20	τουτονί
7. πρόθεσις	C. V. 6.30,2 22.102,16f.	κατ- in κατιδών ἐπί
8. ἐπίρρημα	C. V. 6.24,21ff.	ἐπιστροφάδην, ἐξοπίσω, ἐτέρωσε, βοτρυδόν, σήμερον
9. σύνδεσμος	C. V. 22.101,7ff. and 25.129,5	ἐν, ἐπί, τε, ἄρα

3. Occasionally DH shows more knowledge of linguistic views than the mere use of names of partes orationis. Thus, in Comp. Verb. 12.46,18ff. we find the words οὐδὲν . . . λόγου μόριον, ᾧ σημαίνεται τι σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα. A similar formulation occurs De Dem. 40.215,13ff., πᾶσαν σημαίνουσαν σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα λέξιν. Of course, these words remind one of the definition of ὄνομα in the *Techne* 24,1f., μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα σημαῖνον, where λίθος is an example of the first, παιδεία of the second group. However, the context of DH's phrases clearly shows that he is thinking either of verbs as well as of nouns (Com. Verb.), or of all possible words of whichever class (De Dem.). This means that somewhere he has

picked up these phrases but has applied them to *ὄνομα* in its general sense of 'any word'.

In another case we have still more reason for explaining Dionysius' words by assuming that he has mixed up various pieces of information. In Ep. Amm. 14.433,6ff. he discussed those *σχηματισμοί* in which Thucydides treats *πράγματα* as *πρόσωπα* and, conversely, *σώματα* as *πράγματα*. Usually scholars explain that both *πρόσωπα* and *σώματα* stand for 'persons' and *πράγματα* for 'things', so that here Dionysius would first discuss the device of *προσωποποιία* and then its antithesis.<sup>34)</sup> This explanation is right for the second case, for according to DH in Hist. 1,70 Thucydides puts *τὸ ὑμέτερον* instead of *ὑμεῖς*, thus he uses a *πρᾶγμα*, not a *σῶμα*. In the first case, however, difficulties arise when we follow the traditional interpretation. Here DH quotes Hist. 1,71,7: *πρὸς τάδε βουλευέσθε εὖ, καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πειρᾶσθε μὴ ἐλάσσον' ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ οἱ πατέρες ὑμῖν παρέδοσαν*. To use *ἐξηγεῖσθαι* for *προάγειν ἔξω*,<sup>35)</sup> he says, does not agree with *τὴν Πελοπόννησον* for this is a *χώρα*, whereas the verb does apply to its glory and its power (*τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχουσιν*), and this is what Thucydides means to say. If, indeed, DH here is talking of *προσωποποιία*, he ought to have taken *τὴν Πελοπόννησον* as an animate body, which is improbable. I prefer to believe that he knows an antithesis *πρᾶγμα – σῶμα* (= abstractum – coneretum),<sup>36)</sup> has identified this with another one, viz. *πρόσωπον – πρᾶγμα* (= persona – res). and here uses these terms indiscriminately and without realizing that his first example is a case of the antithesis *πρᾶγμα – σῶμα*, and his second one of *πρόσωπον – πρᾶγμα*.

In Comp. Verb. 5.23,15ff. DH mentions a difference between the referents of *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα*. He says that in principle in a sentence one should put nouns before verbs: *τὰ μὲν γὰρ* (sc. *ὀνόματα*) *τὴν οὐσίαν* (F, Teubner text; *αἰτίαν* P, Budé text) *δηλοῦν, τὰ δὲ* (sc. *ῥήματα*) *τὸ συμβεβηκός, πρότερον δ' εἶναι τῇ φύσει τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν συμβεβηκόντων*. To a certain extent these words remind one of Apoll. Dysc. synt. 18,5ff.: *τοῦ ῥήματος ἀναγκαίως πρόκειται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπεὶ τὸ διατιθέναι καὶ τὸ διατίθεσθαι<sup>37)</sup> σώματος ἴδιον, τοῖς δὲ σώμασι*

<sup>34)</sup> Rhys Roberts, Pritchett and Usher.

<sup>35)</sup> See C. G. Krüger, *Dion. Hal. Historiographica*, Hal. Sax. 1823, 235 on the difficulty of DH taking *προάγειν ἔξω* as equivalent to *ἐξηγεῖσθαι*.

<sup>36)</sup> See Techne 24,3. Cp. G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the proposition*, Amsterdam 1973, 65f.

<sup>37)</sup> Cp. Comp. Verb. 5.24,17 *τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον*.

*ἐπίκειται ἢ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων*. But he does not mention the contrast *οὐσία* and *τὸ συμβεβηκός*. This contrast is not common at all in linguistic works and is found in Choeroboscus<sup>38)</sup> and other late authors only. In traditional grammar *οὐσία* is often used to define *ὄνομα*<sup>39)</sup> but *αἰτία* is never thus used and *τὸ συμβεβηκός* is absent from definitions of *ῥῆμα*. However, both *αἴτιον* (not *αἰτία*) and *τὸ συμβεβηκός* occur in a fragment of the Stoic Zeno<sup>40)</sup> (Stobaeus Ecl. 1, 138, 14 W. = SVF 1, 89), which offers a close parallel to the text of DH: *αἴτιον δ' ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι' ὃ, οὗ δ' αἰτίαν συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δ' αἴτιον κατηγορημα ( . . . ), αἴτιον δ' ἐστὶ δι' ὃ γίνεται τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν κτλ.* The parallel between *αἰτία* (cod. P) and *τὸ συμβεβηκός* in the text of DH on the one hand, and *αἴτιον* and *συμβεβηκός* in Zeno's on the other is striking, the more so as Zeno's examples (*φρόνησις*, *φρονεῖν*) agree with how DH would have classified them, and also because in Stoic texts *κατηγορημα* is commonly used in connection with *ῥῆμα*.<sup>41)</sup> In my opinion, therefore, in the Dionysian passage we have a reminiscence of what in a Stoic treatise was said about *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα*,<sup>42)</sup> and, accordingly, with Mme Aujac we must accept the reading of P, *αἰτίαν*.<sup>43)</sup>

In De Thucyd. 24.362, 10ff. we come across the next passage which calls for comment: *ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνδυαστικοῖς καὶ τοῖς προθετικοῖς καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις ποιητοῦ τρόπου ἐνεξουσιάζων* (sc. ὁ Θουκυδίδης). The same words occur in the quotation in Ep. Amm. 2.423, 16ff., albeit that here *νοημάτων*, not *ὀνομάτων*, is used.<sup>44)</sup> The last words of this passage have been misunderstood by translators and commentators, for from Rhys Roberts onwards, these words have been taken as re-

<sup>38)</sup> 105,2–7. See Steinthal 2,233f., who does not mention the Dionysian passage, and D. Donnet, AC 36, 1967, 38.

<sup>39)</sup> E.g. Techne 33.6ff. To take *οὐσία* as a sure sign of Aristotelian-Peripatetic theory (Wouters 179) is to ignore the many occurrences of *οὐσία* in SVF.

<sup>40)</sup> Stobaeus Eclog. 1.138,14ff. = SVF 1, 89.

<sup>41)</sup> E.g. Diog. Laert. 7.58. Cp. my Studies in the history of ancient linguistics II, Mnem. 37, 1984.

<sup>42)</sup> Steinthal 2.233f. speaks of Aristotelian influence on the passage of n. 38.

<sup>43)</sup> Her reading of this text is based on her observation (44) that F more than once modernizes the text. This is true for 5,26,13; 22.102,16 *σύνδεσμον*, see Usener a.l.

<sup>44)</sup> The interchange between *νοήματα* and *ὀνόματα* is common in the MSS of DH, and decision not always easy.

ferring to particles and articles, which parts “bring out the force of individual words or complete their meaning”.<sup>45)</sup> Unfortunately, in Ep. Amm. we do not have an explanation of these words by examples,<sup>46)</sup> but, nevertheless, we can be sure that DH never meant to designate particles. Such a group was never distinguished by ancient linguists, but is a modern invention. Words which nowadays are put under this vague term were classified in Antiquity mostly as *σύνδεσμοι*, and several of them as *ἐπιρρήματα*.<sup>47)</sup> DH has already mentioned *τὰ συνδευτικά*, therefore by his last words he means another class, which must be none other than the article.<sup>48)</sup> This view is strengthened by a remark in Comp. Verb. 22.98, 2ff. that *ἁρμονία ἀσθηρά* is *ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος, ἀναρθρος κτλ.* and a similar observation in De Dem. 39.213, 17. We know that for DH in prose Thucydides, more than anyone else, represents this style of composition.

But what does DH mean by *διαρθροῦν τὰς δυνάμεις ὀνομάτων*? In other Dionysian texts *δύναμις* is used to mean ‘phonetic value’ of letters or ‘sense’ of words,<sup>49)</sup> and in Comp. Verb. 22.101, 19ff. we find the expression *σιωπὴν τὴν διορίζουσαν ἑκατέρων τῶν γραμμάτων τὰς δυνάμεις*.<sup>50)</sup> Outside these texts we have the Stoic definition of *ἄρθρον* in Diog. Laert. 7, 58: *ἄρθρον (. . .) διορίζον τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἶον Ὅ, Ἡ, Τό, Οἶ, Αἶ, Τά*. This definition applies to a restricted group of Stoic *ἄρθρα* only,<sup>51)</sup> and it, or a similar one, must have been current later, for Apoll. Dysc. (synt. 35, 5ff.) is opposed to those who assert that articles serve for *διάκρισις γενῶν*.

In all probability, therefore, these latter texts provide a clue for the explanation of Dionysius’ wording, in as much as according to DH articles serve as distinctors of gender and number, and thus have to do with the meaning of words. But one is justified in doubting whether he himself understood what he had written.

4. In his treatment of the accidentia of the partes orationis DH has some remarks which are interesting because of their difference

<sup>45)</sup> Usher 529. Cp. Rhys Roberts, 1901, 135 and Pritchett 17 and n. 39.

<sup>46)</sup> For possible reasons for this omission see Ros 53<sup>7</sup> and 66.

<sup>47)</sup> Cp. Antje Hellwig, Glotta 52, 1974, 145–8.

<sup>48)</sup> So Reiske and Blass, AB I<sup>2</sup>, 1887, 222f.

<sup>49)</sup> See Rhys Roberts, indices s.v.

<sup>50)</sup> Cp. *ibid.* 25.135, 1f. and De Dem. 52.242, 16ff. On the trias, mentioned there, of *ὄνομα – τύπος – δύναμις* see Barwick RP 102 and 107, and Hagius 122. This trias is already present in Polybius 10, 47, 8.

<sup>51)</sup> Cp. Pinborg 99.

from those in traditional grammar. Most of these concern accidents of noun and verb, and when discussing these I shall also go into his terminology of accidents themselves.

First, however, comes a short discussion of the only passage where DH mentions accidents of classes other than noun and verb. In Comp. Verb. 5.24, 17ff. he takes the view that verbs are to be put before adverbs: *ἐπειδὴ πρότερόν ἐστι τῆ φύσει τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον τῶν συνεδρευόντων αὐτοῖς, τρόπον λέγω καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον, καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων, ἃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ἐπιρρήματα*. To typify adverbs by *τὰ συνεδρευόντα τοῖς ῥήμασιν* reminds one of Priscian's information on the view of Stoics who did not distinguish adverbs as a separate class and quasi adiectiva verborum ea nominabant,<sup>52)</sup> but this vague parallel is less interesting than the three kinds of adverbs which DH mentions: *ἐπιρρήματα τρόπον, τόπον* and *χρόνον*.<sup>53)</sup> The latter two terms are known from traditional grammar but the first does not occur there at all.<sup>54)</sup> DH quotes Homeric lines as examples of the order verb—adverb, and conversely, but does not indicate which adverb belongs to which subclass. However, we may safely assume that to him *ἔξοπίσω*, *ἑτέρωσε* and *σήμερον* are adverbs of place and time, and, consequently, that *ἐπιστροφάδην* and *βοτρυνδόν* are adverbs of manner. In Techne 75,1 *βοτρυνδόν*, together with *πύξ*, *λάξ* and *ἀγεληδόν*, is called *ἐπίρρημα ποιότητος*,<sup>55)</sup> and the identification of *τρόπον* with *ποιότητος* is easy to make. This is the more so as when explaining the Techne passage ancient commentators connect these adverbs with a sense of "the manner in which," e.g. Schol. DTh. 60,3ff.: *τὰ δηλοῦντα τὸν τοῦ σχήματος τρόπον καὶ τὴν ἔνδειξιν καλεῖται ποιότητος, οἷον πῶς ἔτυψε; πύξ· πῶς ἤρχοντο; ἀγεληδόν· πῶς ἐκαθέζοντο; γνύξ*.<sup>56)</sup> In the case of DH we do not know whether he uses a current word or introduces a term of his own—though the first alternative seems more acceptable—, at any rate his *ἐπίρρημα τρόπον* is unique in ancient linguistics.

Accidentia themselves are indicated by various terms; once *παρακολουθεῖν* is used in this way, but more usual is *τὰ συμβεβη-*

<sup>52)</sup> II, 16.54,10.

<sup>53)</sup> *Καὶ τῶν παραπλ.* hints at more than three kinds, but DH does not say how many. E.g. Techne 73,3 and 76,2.

<sup>54)</sup> In Gramm. Lat. adverbia modi does not occur either.

<sup>55)</sup> Cp. Ap. Dysc. adv. 205,2: *πάν εἰς δὸν λήγον ἐπίρρημα ποιότητός ἐστι παρεμφατικόν, οὐ τύπον, βοτρυνδόν κτλ.* *Ἐπιστροφάδην* is not commented upon in Sch. II.

<sup>56)</sup> Cp. Uhlig ad Techne 75,1.

κότα.<sup>57)</sup> This word also serves to indicate properties of letters and of styles of composition.<sup>58)</sup> Accidents of syllables, however, are called *πάθη*.<sup>59)</sup> *Τὰ συμβεβηκότα*, when referring to accidents of parts of speech, comprise more features than are indicated by the traditional term of *τὰ παρεπόμενα* in e.g. Apollonius' works. For in *De Dem.* 55 DH lists the following features: *συστολαί, ἐκτάσεις, ὀξύτητες, βαρύτητες, γένη, πτώσεις, ἀριθμοί, ἐγκλίσεις, τὰ ἄλλα παραπλήσια τούτοις μυρία ὄντα*. In a much abbreviated form the list is found again in *Comp. Verb.* 25, *ἐκτάσεις, συστολαί, προσωδίαί καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις*, where *προσωδίαί* is a substitute for *ὀξύτητες* and *βαρύτητες* in the first passage. In traditional grammar *συστολαί* and *ἐκτάσεις* are placed under the *πάθη λέξεων*, morphological modifications,<sup>60)</sup> but breathings are not put there. However, even later still, *προσωδίαί* is used as a generic term of which *τόνος, χρόνοι, πνεύματα* and *πάθη* are the differentiae.<sup>61)</sup>

Thus we see that as far as terms for accidents and their contents are concerned, DH differs from traditional grammarians:

- *τὰ συμβεβηκότα*, not *τὰ παρεπόμενα*, is used (1),
- *τὰ συμβ.* also comprise the *πάθη λέξεων* of traditional grammar and the breathings (2),
- *πάθη* is used in connection with *πάθη συλλαβῶν*, not with *πάθη λέξεων* (3).

From *Comp. Verb.* 15 it appears that *πάθη συλλαβῶν* are the differences in short and long syllables which vary in proportion to the number of consonants before the vowel of the syllable,<sup>62)</sup> as well as the various sound values (harsh, smooth, soft etc.). In this context *κατασκευάζειν* also occurs, and *ibid.* 61,8 *αἱ τῶν συλλαβῶν κατασκευαί* is used to indicate manipulation of the properties of the syllables. In the examples of this procedure we find new terms, viz. *παρέκτασις* in connection with Homeric forms, *βοόωσιν* and *ψηλαφῶν* (60, 13 ff.), and *ἡ τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων ἐλάττωσις*, probably referring to the forms *ἀμβλήδην* and *ἐκπλήγεν*. More common in traditional

<sup>57)</sup> *Παρακολουθεῖν*: *Comp. Verb.* 6.29,12, cp. *Ap. Dysc. pron.* 4,3. *τὰ συμβεβ.*: *Comp. Verb.* 25.132,7; 135,4 = *De Dem.* 52.242,20 f.

<sup>58)</sup> *Comp. Verb.* 14.50,10; *De Dem.* 36.209,25 and 50.237,9. Cp. *De Thuc.* 22.358,17.

<sup>59)</sup> *Comp. Verb.* 15.59,15 f. and 25.135,3 = *De Dem.* 52.242,20 f.

<sup>60)</sup> See Schneider *Ap. Dysc. Fragm.* 177 f. and E. Siebenborn, *Die Lehre von der Sprachrichtigkeit und ihre Kriterien*, Amsterdam 1976, 44.

<sup>61)</sup> See Steinthal 2, 205 ff. and Wouters 192.

<sup>62)</sup> Cp. Rhys Roberts 1910 a.1.



grammar are (ἐπ-)έκτασις and συστολή, words that DH uses elsewhere (ibid. 25.135, 4f.), but then alongside with πάθη, as we have seen.

Outside the context of a discussion of πάθη DH uses the verbs ἐκθλίβειν and συναλείφειν in connection with the rapid pronunciation of οἶομαι and δέον.<sup>63</sup>) These verbs, together with the noun συναλοιφή in Comp. Verb., are used here for the first time as grammatical terms (see LSJ).

As far as the individual accidents are concerned, those of nouns agree with what we know about them from traditional grammar. They are the following: ἐνικῶς—πληθυντικῶς, ὀρθή πτώσις—πλάγιοι πτώσεις, ἀρσενικά/ἄρρενα—θηλυκά—οὐδέτερα, and πτώσεις αἰτιατική, γενική and δοτική.<sup>64</sup>)

More variation and differences are shown in the list of verbal accidents:

Comp. Verb. 6,29,7 ff.:	τὰ ὀρθά — τὰ ὕπτια ἐγκλίσεις, ἃς δὴ τινες πτώσεις ῥηματικὰς καλοῦσιν (ποίας) παρεμφαίοντα διαφορὰς χρόνων καὶ εἴ τινα τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἄλλα παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκε
5.24,35 and 26,14	τὸ ποιοῦν — τὸ πάσχον τὰ ὀρθά — τὰ ἐγκεκλιμένα τὰ παρεμφατικά — τὰ ἀπαρεμφατικά (or vice versa)
De Thuc. 24.362,1 f. = Ep. Amm. 2.423,8 f. Ep. Amm. 7.427,17 ff.	τὰ παθητικά — τὰ δραστήρια τὰ παθητικά — τὰ ποιητικά τὸ παθητικόν — τὸ ἐνεργητικόν
εκx.	κωλύεται κωλύει ἐπιμιγνόμεοι ἐπιμιγνόντες ἐναλλάγησαν συνήλλαξαν κατωκημένους κατωκηκότας
ibid. 12.431,22 ff.	(χρόνοι τῶν ῥημάτων), τὸ μὲν ἐθέλοισιν <sup>65</sup> ) ῥῆμα τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστὶ χρόνου δηλωτικόν, τὸ δὲ περιγίγνεται τοῦ παρόντος . . . τὸ μὲν γίγνεται τοῦ παρόντος ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἔσται τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου δηλωτικόν.

To take the last passage first, Aristotle, Poet. 1457a17f., βαδί-  
 ζει. . . προσσημαίνει τὸν παρόντα χρόνον seems to be a parallel, and,

<sup>63</sup>) Cp. Rhys Roberts 1910, s.v. συναλοιφή.

<sup>64</sup>) Comp. Verb. 6.29,1ff.; De Dem. 27.189,8ff.; De Thuc. 24.362,3ff.; Ep. Amm. 2.423ff.; 9.428,19ff. and 11.430,12ff.

<sup>65</sup>) Following Krüger (lviii) H. Usener, Dion. Hal. libr. de imitatione rell., Bonn 1889, 108 prefers ἐθέλοισιν of cod. C.

accordingly, we are not compelled to take the words of DH as technical terms, though it would not be inappropriate to do so. If we choose the latter course, *ὁ παρῶν χρόνος* would be notable, for *ὁ ἐνεστώς χρόνος* is the traditional word. *Ὁ μέλλον χρόνος* is quite usual. The pronouncement that *ἐθέλομεν* is 'a verbal form which indicates the future' (so Rhys Roberts) is not unusual either when we consider Apoll. Dysc., synt. 354, 11 ff. Among the terms for the genders *παθητικόν* and *ἐνεργητικόν* are traditional, *δραστήριον* has a parallel in *δραστικόν* in Schol. DTh. 401, 2f., and similar words in Apoll. Dysc. pron. 44, 1 etc., but *ποιητικόν* is unique in this sense of active (not in LSJ). The pair *ὀρθόν*—*ὑπτιον* too belongs to this accident, for Schol. DTh. 1.1. says, *ἐνεργητικὴ διάθεσις (. . .) ἦτις παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δραστικὴ καὶ ὀρθὴ καλεῖται* and *παθητικὴ (. . .) ἦτις παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπτία καλεῖται* (cp. 548, 35 ff.). In view of what we know from Diog. Laert. 7, 64 we can trace this distinction to the Stoics.<sup>66</sup>)

This assignment of *ὀρθόν*—*ὑπτιον* to gender means that in Comp. Verb. 6 we obtain the following tripartition, *ὀρθά*—*ὑπτια* ~ genders, *ἐγκλίσεις* ~ moods, *διαφορὰς χρόνων* ~ tenses. However, *ibid.* 5, 1. 1 we meet with the antithesis *ὀρθά*—*ἐγκεκλιμένα* (PMV; *ἐγκλινόμενα* F) (and *ἀπαρεμφαιικά*—*παρεμφαιικά*), which distinction does not square with those of ch. 6. If I understand him rightly, Steinthal (2, 274) thinks that both distinctions are compatible, if one interprets them as follows: in ch. 6 the pair *ὀρθά*—*ὑπτια* distinguishes between *indicativi praesentis* and all other moods and tenses, *ὑπτια* then is split up, first into *ἐγκλίσεις*, moods and finally into *χρόνοι*, tenses. This division, he thinks, occurs in ch. 5 too, where *ὀρθά*—*ἐγκεκλιμένα* tallies with the pair *indicatives*—*non-indicatives*, and *παρεμφαιικά*—*ἀπαρεμφαιικά* with that of *non-infinitives*—*infinitives*. I believe that the distinction *ὀρθά*—*ὑπτια* can better be explained as one of gender only, and that Steinthal's solution, though consistent, is wrong. The antithesis *ὀρθά*—*ἐγκεκλιμένα* may well be one of *indicatives* v. *non-indicatives*, but it is not necessary to take *ὀρθά* in both passages in the same way. DH avails himself of different distinctions, without being aware that they differ.<sup>67</sup>)

At any rate, we see that the terminology in Comp. Verb. 5 and 6 is quite different from that in De Dem. 52 and Comp. Verb. 24 and 25, ll. ll., in as far as in the first passages *τὰ συμβεβηκότα* does not

<sup>66</sup>) Cp. Pohlenz 177 ff.

<sup>67</sup>) See also my Studies II.

occur. Now the background of Comp. Verb. 5–6 seems quite Stoic,<sup>68)</sup> so take τὰ συμβεβηκότα, which does not occur here, as a distinctly Stoic term is uncalled for.<sup>69)</sup> On the other hand, when τὰ συμβεβηκότα does occur, DH is speaking in general terms about how at school children are taught γραμματική;<sup>70)</sup> nor does this prove a Stoic origin. According to Pinborg 101 “this purely Aristotelian concept of accident is inconsistent with Stoic epistemology” and he thinks (111) that the use of accident “could point to a direct peripatetic influence on grammar, which otherwise is difficult to prove”; he adds that “it is probably not accidental that Dionysius of Halicarnassus who used peripatetic sources, is our first witness to the use of the term accident as a technical term of grammar.” In favour of this view one may adduce another Peripatetic (and Platonic) view in this chapter of Comp. Verb. (25.134,11): ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ὧν ἐνέργειά τις ἢ ποίησις τὸ τέλος.<sup>71)</sup> But the comparison with musical education here, as well as the proper subject of this chapter, viz. the differences and similarities between prose and poetry, remind one of views proposed by οἱ κριτικοί. These people were inclined to Stoic theories.<sup>72)</sup> On the whole, I do not exclude the possibility therefore, that τὰ συμβεβηκότα was used in Stoic grammar (cp. also SVF 1, 89 and 2, 509), but cannot prove it.

5. We may now turn to the remarks of DH which have to do with the more philosophical aspects of linguistic theory. Several times already I have quoted passages on word order; now I shall deal with these systematically. In Comp. Verb. 5 DH embarks on a fundamental treatment of the question whether a natural order of word classes exists and is to be followed in the σύνθεις. In the previous chapter he had said that when preparing his treatise he had studied in particular Stoic writings, because Stoics “were accustomed to pay no little attention to the department of discourse” (tr. Rh. Rob.). However, a work such as Chrysippus’ περὶ τῆς

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<sup>68)</sup> See section 5 and e.g. Pohl, 80.

<sup>69)</sup> So Barwick Probl. 47, but see Pinborg 101f.

<sup>70)</sup> In De Dem. 52 and Comp. Verb. 25 γραμματικὴ τέχνη refers to phonology and morphology as well as to reading, subjects children are taught at school (cp. *ibid.* 14.50,17), but De Thuc. 51.410,17 (cp. 45.417,22 and De Lysia 4.12,17) γραμματικὴ ἐξήγησις, which even those with a thorough knowledge of Thucydides are in need of, has a wider meaning, of course, of philological commentary.

<sup>71)</sup> Cp. Plato Symp. 205b and Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1094a4.

<sup>72)</sup> See note 7.

*συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων* had nothing to do with rhetoric, but was concerned with dialectic. Therefore, DH put these Stoic works aside, and “falling back upon my own resources [I] proceeded to consider whether I could find some starting-point indicated by nature itself” (*φυσικὴν ἀφορμὴν*). This too led to a dead end, but nevertheless he undertakes to treat of it, in order to avoid the blame of having neglected a fruitful approach. Hence his discussion in ch. 5.

Thus it seems that DH has independently embarked on this matter. But at the end of ch. 5 (26, 20 ff.) he brackets together this research and that of *τέχνη διαλεκτική*. Therefore, there is a considerable chance at least that DH has been led to the problem of a natural word order by these Stoic *τέχναι*, if he has not taken over from these his exposition in ch. 5.<sup>73</sup>) Later on, we shall see that this speculation turns out to be almost a certainty.

DH tells his addressee that he started from the conception that we must follow nature as much as possible and must put together *τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου* such as she wishes. Therefore *ὀνόματα* must come before *ῥήματα* (see p. 78), then verbs before adverbs (see p. 81), what happens first before what happens later, and, finally, nouns before adjectives,<sup>74</sup>) *προσηγορικά* before *ὀνόματα*, *ἀντονομασῖαι* before *προσηγορικά*, and in the case of verbs, *τὰ ὀρθά* before *τὰ ἐγκεκλιμένα* and *τὰ παρεμφατικά* before *τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα*.<sup>75</sup>) In the first three instances quotations are given which prove that a pleasant composition can be attained irrespective of whether one keeps to the natural order or not. Later on he stops giving examples, but this causes no wonder, for to him this whole avenue of thought is worthless.

Upton (1702, see G. H. Schaefer, comm. 1808) and Rhys Roberts (1910) have referred here to Quintilian 9, 4, 23–5 who mentions a similar theory: *est et alius naturalis ordo, ut viros ac feminas (. . .) dicas potius quam retrorsum. (. . .) illa nimia quorundam fuit observatio ut vocabula verbis, verba rursus adverbis, nomina appositis et pronomibus essent priora (. . .) et illa nimiae superstitionis, uti quaeque sint tempore, ita facere etiam ordine priora.*<sup>76</sup>) The similarities are indeed significant, the only exceptions being the

<sup>73</sup>) Pohl 78 and Aujac 204.

<sup>74</sup>) See note 15.

<sup>75</sup>) Thus cod. F, Teubner; Cod. P, Aujac *τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα (πρὸ) τῶν παρεμφατικῶν*. Cp. Ap. Dysc. synt. 324 ff.

<sup>76</sup>) Cp. F. R. Verwig, *Der rhet. Naturbegriff bei Quintilian*, Heidelberg 1976, 108–10.

distinction between and the order of *προσηγορίαι* and *ὀνόματα*, and the placing of *ἀντονομασίαι* before *προσηγορικά*.

Another parallel from a rhetorical work is to be found in Demetrius *περὶ ἔργου*. 199: *καὶ ὁλως* (in the plain character and in lucid narrative) *τῇ φυσικῇ τάξει τῶν ὀνομάτων χρηστέον, ὡς τὸ Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι εἰς τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον* (Thuc. (1,24,1). *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὠνόμασται τὸ περὶ οὗ, δεύτερον δὲ δ τοῦτο ἐστίν, ὅτι πόλις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς*. In the next paragraph Demetrius gives counter-examples which are also acceptable. Pseudo-Longinus, too, knows of *ἡ ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰμοῦ τάξις* (22,1). Accordingly, though these four literary critics reject the idea of a natural word order as the only acceptable guide in composition, it is clear that such a view was current.<sup>77)</sup>

Basically, the same view is also found in Apoll. *Dysc. synt.* 15,6ff., but this parallel has almost never been noted.<sup>78)</sup> Apollonius there discusses the order of the parts of speech, comparable to that of letters, because in both cases ratio is dominating and guiding. He compares the order of nominative—other cases, present—other tenses, and masculine—feminine—neuter gender. In all these instances the order is *κατὰ λόγον*, not *κατὰ τύχην*. As to the parts of speech, Apollonius argues for the order of *ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον, ἀντωνυμία, πρόθεσις, ἐπίρρημα* and *σύνδεσμος* (*synt.* 15,6–27,16).

Which *τάξις* is meant here? The comparison with the alphabet suggest word order in the sentence, but Apollonius does not say so explicitly. Pinborg (119) thinks that “this order primarily expresses the relative importance of the parts of speech in the sentence, only secondarily the actual word order”, but this view is only partially right. From the comparison with the alphabet, where the letters β, γ, etc. all are seen as derivations of the α (19,11ff.), as well as from terms used, such as *θέσις, μετάπτωσις, πρεσβύτερον, ἀρχαιότερον*, it appears that *τάξις* also has to do with a chronological order of origin of the parts of speech: before a verb could come into being, a noun had to exist, otherwise a verb could not express the action (or passion) which had to be connected with the noun.<sup>79)</sup> All the same, noun and verb are *τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη*, they cannot be left out, and consequently, the Apollonian *τάξις* indicates the relative importance

<sup>77)</sup> For similar views on the natural order in other subjects cp. De Dem. 33.202,18; Comp. Verb. 2.7,23ff.; De Thuc. 11.341ff. and see H. Caplan on Ad Herenn. 3,16 and F. Striller De Stoic. stud. rhet., Bresl. Abh. I, 2, 35.

<sup>78)</sup> Pohl 79.

<sup>79)</sup> Cp. adv. 121,4ff.

of parts of speech too and has a hierarchical character in addition to that of chronological priority.

These two priorities of parts of speech have their counterpart in those of the accidents. In synt. 324, 10ff. Apollonius argues extensively for the view that the infinitive as *τὸ γενικώτατον ῥῆμα* should come before the indicative and therefore deserves a treatment prior to the latter mood, even when from a didactic point of view the opposite order of treatment looks preferable. Here, too, Apollonius argues for a chronological priority, for the logos proves that the infinitive may be compared with the original words, *τὰ πρωτότυπα*, and the indicative with their derivatives, *τὰ παραγωγά*.

But in the case of some parts of speech Apollonius takes *τάξις* as the actual word order. The preposition may have a later origin than the noun, nevertheless it stands before the noun it belongs to (*μεταγενεστέρα μὲν ἐστὶ τῆ φύσει, τῆ δὲ τάξει ἀρκτική*). The same is true for the article, *ἄρθρον προτακτικόν*.<sup>80</sup>)

All in all, we must deduce from these and related passages that to Apollonius *ἡ κατὰ λόγον τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου τάξις* (synt. 15, 7f.) refers to an order of parts of speech which is chronological, hierarchical and, to a certain extent, one of the actual order of words in a sentence.

This order is quite rational, he says, i. e. by means of reasoning one can deduce which words came into existence first. Moreover, the whole of this train of thought presupposes the view that language is dependent on an original namegiver (*θέσει*) and has been given in accordance with the natural state of things (*φύσει*), which view is definitely Stoic.<sup>81</sup>)

To come back to the Dionysian passages, we now detect several similarities between his remarks and those of Apollonius, e. g. when DH says that nouns *πρότερον εἶναι* than verbs (23, 17f.). Apollonius, however, stresses less than DH the natural order in the sense of word order, but this approach was understandably more attractive to DH and other literary critics.

Several points remain for discussion here. Why does DH assert that *προσηγορικά* must be put before *ὀνόματα*, and *ἀντονομασίαι* before *προσηγορικά*? In Stoic opinion *προσηγορίαι* indicate a *κοινή ποιότης* and *ὀνόματα* an *ἰδία ποιότης* (Diog. Laert. 7, 58). In view of the Stoic character of chapter 5 we may assume that Dionysius' order was

<sup>80</sup>) Synt. 27, 1ff.

<sup>81</sup>) D. Fehling, Rhein. Mus. 108, 1965, 218ff. Steinthal 2, 231ff. must be accordingly corrected.

influenced by a presumed order of *κοινά—ἴδια*, but I have yet to find an exact parallel. Much more difficult is the explanation of the order pronoun—common noun. Apollonius, synt. 20, 1 ff., declares it not unreasonable if one wishes to put—i. e. to discuss—the pronouns before the verbs because they replace the nouns, but he rejects this view. But this passage does not help in explaining Dionysius' order. Apollonius, however, does give an exact parallel to what DH says about the order *ἀπαρεμφατικά—παρεμφατικά* (26, 15), whether with MS P we accept this order, or with F the order *παρεμφατικά—ἀπαρεμφατικά*. Apollonius defends the first order, but confesses to have formerly adhered to the second one (synt. 327, 13 ff.).

At the beginning of this section I suggested that in chapter 5 DH was inspired by Stoic sources, to say the least. This suggestion has become almost a certainty, now that we have met with the parallels mentioned, to which I also reckon what has been said about *αἰτία—συμβεβηκός* (p. 79) and about *ὀρθά—ὑπτια* (p. 84).

6. Gradually a picture of DH has developed as a man who can easily use parts of different linguistic theories. Sometimes this eclectic procedure leads him into contradictions. This is clearly the case when we compare Comp. Verb. 16. 62, 9 ff. with 18. 74, 2. In the first passage he describes several Homeric lines as felicitously expressing things. For this feature nature is responsible, *ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικὸς καὶ θετικὸς*<sup>82)</sup> *ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τινὰς εὐλόγους καὶ κινητικὸς τῆς διανοίας ὁμοιότητος*. These words accord with the Stoic view that originally language is an exact replica of things signified, and that when composing names the namegiver acted in a precise way, be it that here we, not an imaginary name-giver, are said to do so.

However, in the second passage Dionysius deplores the fact that not all rhythms are equally excellent, and recommends that, consequently, we mix both good and ugly rhythms, in the same way as this is to be done in many cases, *τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ἔτυχεν* (74, 2). This idea is the very opposite of the first one: *ὡς ἔτυχεν* versus *κατὰ τινὰς εὐλόγους ὁμοιότητος*. This second opinion may have been taken from a Peripatetic source, also because of the similarities between this passage and 16. 66, 18 ff., which latter passage is preceded by a quotation from Theophrastus' *περὶ λέξεως*.<sup>83)</sup>

<sup>82)</sup> *καὶ θετ.* not in P, omitted by Usener, but retained by Fehling 222.

<sup>83)</sup> Cp. Pohl 120.

We must not imagine that between ch. 16 and ch. 18 Dionysius has changed his mind; on the contrary, he only reproduces what he has read, without realizing its implications.

The first opinion, that of *φύσις* as the originator of language, we find again in Comp. Verb. 3. 14, 11 ff.; Herodotus has not picked and chosen his words with studious care; no they are *οἷα ἢ φύσις τέθηκεν σύμβολα τοῖς πράγμασιν*. One may wonder whether this expression betrays a Peripatetic source,—the use of *σύμβολα* certainly leads us to think so<sup>84</sup>)—and in that case, confusion between Peripatetic and Stoic views seems complete.

7. Dionysius' views on figurations and figures of speech are closely related to the idea that there are natural properties of language. Of course, here is not the place to treat the whole of the theory of *σχήματα*, but only its linguistic aspects.

These aspects are not touched upon in the earlier treatises, where, moreover, by *σχήματα* almost exclusively the Gorgianic figures are meant. It is not before De Dem. and Comp. Verb. again that DH draws linguistic theory into the discussion of *σχηματισμοί*.<sup>85</sup>) Very evidently he does so in Comp. Verb., De Thuc. and its appendix, Ep. Amm., although not in a consistent way.

In Comp. Verb. 6 three functions of compositions are distinguished, *ἀρμογή*, *σχηματισμός*, and *κατασκευή*;<sup>86</sup>) all three have their place, irrespective of their objects, viz. single words, cola and periods. *Κατασκευή* comprises three processes, *ἀφαίρεσις*, *προσθήκη* and *ἀλλοίωσις*. This triad is well known from Plato's Cratylus, has a firm place in traditional grammar, and is transferred here to the field of rhetoric.<sup>87</sup>) In the case of word modifications DH mentions *τουτονί* (pro *τουτων*) and *κατιδεῖν* (pro *ιδεῖν*) as examples of adiectio, *μητ'* (*ιδίας*) to illustrate detractio, also called *συναλοιφή*, whereas mutatio is demonstrated by the pairs *ἐχωροφίλησε—ἐφιλοχώρησε* and *ἀφαιρήσομαι—ἀφαιρεθήσομαι*.

Under the heading of *σχηματισμός* of single words fall the many accidentia, dealt with in section 4, whereas in the part on the shaping of clauses DH uses the Stoic theory of speech acts, which I

<sup>84</sup>) Cp. Fehling 224 and Aujac 74.

<sup>85</sup>) See note 11.

<sup>86</sup>) MSS vary between *κατασκευή* and *μετασκευή*. See Aujac.

<sup>87</sup>) Cp. Th. Herrle, Quaest. rhet. ad elocut. pertin., Leipzig 1912, 40f. DH does not distinguish between *μετάθεσις* (transposition) and *ἀλλοίωσις* (transmutation), for which see H. Caplan on Ad Herenn. 4,29 and Siebenborn 44. In his later examples DH concentrates on addition and subtraction.



have discussed elsewhere,<sup>88</sup>) and which he calls *τρόποι τῆς ἐκφορᾶς τῶν νοημάτων*. After giving a list of these shapes he adds that a multitude of *σχηματισμοὶ καὶ τῆς λέξεως ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς διανοίας* exists, but then he drops the subject.

In these chapters DH sees composition as a conscious art; therefore, it is understandable that the subject of a natural configuration is not raised. This is done, however, in other texts, especially when the style of Thucydides comes under discussion. Then DH is talking about a natural sequence and agreement between words in phrases, and Thucydides' *σχηματισμοί* are seen as deviations (*ἐξαλλαγή*). Thus, the *ἁρμονία αὐστηρά*, of which Thucydides is a prime example, is characterized by *τὸ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τῶν προεξενεχθέντων ὑπεροπτικῶς ἔχειν τὴν φράσιν μηδὲ κατ' ἄλληλα*.<sup>89</sup>) Elsewhere the most characteristic trait of his style appears to be *τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθειᾶν ἐρμηνεῖαν ἐξηγητέχθαι τὰ νοήματα μηδ' ὡς ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις σύνηθες λέγειν, ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀφελῶς, ἀλλὰ ἐξηλλάχθαι καὶ ἀπεστράφθαι τὴν διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἔθει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὰ μὴ συνήθη τοῖς πολλοῖς μηδ' ὡς ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ*.<sup>90</sup>) An example of this process is the use of a nomen feminini generis together with a partic. masc., *ἐξ ὧν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία πλανᾶται*.<sup>91</sup>)

Consequently, we here have the identification of usual (*συνήθης*) with natural (*φυσική*) word order and sequence. Whether this naturalness has at the same time the oldest rights, is not stated, but only implicitly assumed.

Deviation from usual agreement leads to incorrect usage, and, therefore, the Thucydidean configurations more than once are called *σολοικοφανεῖς*.<sup>92</sup>) This close relationship between these *σχηματισμοί* and *σολοικισμοί* most emphatically appears in De Thuc. 37.389, 7ff., where with reference to Hist. 5,86 Dionysius exclaims, *τοῦτο τὸ τελευταῖον εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς σχήμασι ἀξιῶσει φέρειν, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι πάντας τοὺς σολοικισμούς, ὅσοι γίνονται παρὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς καὶ παρὰ τὰς πτώσεις, σχήματα καλεῖν*.<sup>93</sup>)

This kind of figure of speech Quintilian also discusses (9, 3, 2ff.), asserting that it *loquendi rationem novat* and may be called *genus*

<sup>88</sup>) Studies II. Cp. De Dem. 54.246,14f.

<sup>89</sup>) De Dem. 39.213,10ff., cp. Comp. Verb. 22.98,2f.

<sup>90</sup>) De Dem. 9.145,6ff., cp. Ep. Amm. 3.425,16; 10.429,9 and 18f.; 11.430,14 etc.

<sup>91</sup>) De Thuc. 24.362,6f., cp. 53.413,2ff.; De Dem. 9.147,9 and 39.213,1.

<sup>92</sup>) E.g. De Thuc. 24.362,16; 33.381,6f. cp. 41.396,26f. and Ep. Anm. 2.

<sup>93</sup>) Cp. Ep. Amm. 11.431,6ff. and see p. 74.

grammaticum. He too stresses the link with *vitia orationis*, and more explicitly than DH he explains that these figures are acceptable because of *auctoritas*, *vetustas*, *consuetudo*, and, sometimes, *ratio*. Similar views are currently expressed after Quintilian,<sup>94)</sup> but DH is one of the first authors who combines rhetorical and grammatical doctrine. Although Barwick's statements on a Stoic origin of the theory of figures are rightly rejected by Fehling<sup>95)</sup> and new research on this subject is necessary, I shall not pursue this matter here. I only point out that the frequent occurrences of *ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀπαγγελία*, *ἀκολουθία*, *κατάλληλος* etc. in these parts dealing with configurations seem to betray Stoic influence.<sup>96)</sup>

If this suggestion is accepted, it will influence one's view on the sources of the treatises on Thucydides, particularly as far as linguistic theories play a part here. Usener expressed the opinion that DH used works of Alexandrian grammarians, and Luschnat agrees with him.<sup>97)</sup> One may wonder, however, whether 'Alexandrian' is the right word,<sup>98)</sup> but, of course, this scepticism is related to the far-reaching problem of the level of grammatical theory in the circle of Alexandrian scholars, a problem which falls outside the scope of this article.

8. At the outset I drew attention to the absence of any mention of linguistic aspects from the earlier treatises, even when DH could well have mentioned such aspects.<sup>99)</sup> When researching the matter of composition of words, he came across grammatical theories and used these in his own treatises. These are mainly of Stoic provenance, as we have seen, but we do not yet know to what extent Stoic theory had become common knowledge and had been transferred to other linguistic works.

Two questions are then raised whether these traces of linguistic theories are a reliable indication of the level of common knowledge of linguistics in Rome at the end of the first century B.C. (1), and even of the level of linguistic theory at all at that time (2).

Before entering into the first question we may consider several related points. First, we must take into account that DH was not

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<sup>94)</sup> Cp. Ros 54ff., Von Fritz, *AJPh* 70, 1949, 344ff. and Siebenborn 92ff.

<sup>95)</sup> *GGA* 212, 1958, 169ff.

<sup>96)</sup> Cp. Pinborg 102f. and D. L. Blank, *Studies in the syntactic theory of Apollonius Dyscolus*, thesis, Princeton 1980, 53ff. und App. A.

<sup>97)</sup> Usener (see note 65), 71ff. O. Luschnat, *Philol.* 98, 1954, 22ff.

<sup>98)</sup> Cp. Ros 65<sup>96</sup>.

<sup>99)</sup> E.g. *De Isocr.* 14.74,15.

a competent linguist, but at best a sound layman. Secondly, the sources he quotes by name are mostly “the old ones” — Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Aristoxenus, Chrysippus, Epicurus, Callimachus, Aristophanes of Byzantium, but not e.g. Aristarchus, Dionysius Thrax, Diogenes of Babylon, Trypho, Posidonius. As one must conclude from the list in Rhys Roberts’ edition of *Comp. Verb.* 50, DH mentions no author from later than second century B.C. However, at one time we can be sure that DH used a much more recent source, viz. a treatise of Philodemus,<sup>100</sup>) and at other the same conclusion applies with great probability when the works of *οἱ κριτικοί* are concerned (see note 7).

Therefore, we need not infer that the linguistic knowledge of DH represents an older, or even antiquated, level of grammatical theory. For other reasons, too, this inference is rather improbable: in his treatises DH uses the nine-parts system. If the eight-parts system was current in these times, he would at least have mentioned the modern system. For, as Mme Aujac (I, 15) rightly remarks, DH is always afraid of not seeming to be well up in his subject. A similar argument shows that his remark on *ἄρθρον δεικτικόν* is not wholly outmoded, and certainly what he says on the accidents in *Comp. Verb.* 25 (~ *De Dem.* 52) does not represent dated views, for it occurs in a sketch on current education in grammar at school, which, if already passé, would have made him a laughing-stock.

For all these observations I am inclined not to brand much of what DH offers on linguistic subjects as antiquated theory, but to draw from it the inference that his remarks correspond with the level of common knowledge of linguistic views which then at Rome, at least in Greek circles, were circulating. An exception, I think, must be made for the list of accidents in *Comp. Verb.* 6.29, 8ff., which seems to come directly from an older source.

The second question is much more difficult to answer and involves an extensive discussion of all available data. As I have said before, it is not my intention to do so here. I may only remark that acceptance of my answer to the first questions strengthens the case of those who think that the proper evolution of ancient grammar is to be put in the first century B.C.<sup>101</sup>)

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<sup>100</sup>) *De Isocr.* 13.73,5ff. See Aujac I, 193ff.

<sup>101</sup>) Fehling, *Gnomon* 51, 1979, 589.

9. The main results of this inquiry are:

(1) DH uses a system of nine word classes, without showing awareness of the so-called traditional system of eight parts of speech.

(2) Twice his classifications of words betray the existence of older systems with fewer parts.

(3) He offers the only parallel to the statement that Dionysius Thrax called pronouns *ἄρθρα δεικτικά*.

(4) He stands alone in mentioning *ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου*, presumably an equivalent of *ἐπιρρήματα ποιότητος*.

(5) His views on natural word order and agreement correspond on many points with those of Apollonius Dyscolus, and are probably of Stoic origin.

(6) Stoic influence on his views can also be seen in his statements on the origin of language and on the relation between noun and verb. Whether his use of *συμβεβηκότα*, instead of *παρεπόμενα* of traditional grammar, is influenced by Stoic theory, remains to be seen.

(7) There is a strong probability that a great part of what DH offers on linguistic subjects corresponds with the level of common knowledge of linguistic views circulating in Greek circles at Rome at the end of the first century B.C.

### Greek *καπάνη* and Latin *caranna*

By DEMETRIUS MOUTSOS, Rochester

*Καπάνη* f. 'mule-car', the Thessalian counterpart of *ἀπήνη* 'four-wheeled wagon, any car or chariot' (Ath. 10.418e), and the variant *καπάνη* are derivatives of *κάπη* 'crib, manger', cf. *κάπτω* 'gulp down'. In Pollux 1.142 *καπάνη* means the cross-piece in the chariot seat, whereas the side-pieces are named *καπάνακες*. On the other hand, the Hesychian gloss *καπαλαί·[κάπηλοι] φάτναι* has been considered spurious. The interpretation *κάπηλοι* 'retail-dealers; tavern-keepers' has been correctly doubted as being dittographic,<sup>1)</sup> and the gloss itself, whose meaning is identical to that of *κάπη*, has been emended

<sup>1)</sup> *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, ed. K. Latte, Hauniae 2 (1966) 409 s.v.